Reading Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind III: On Soul Work

Note: Oh yes — there’s more.

13 September 1999

Sections 406 to 412 are odd sections, ranging from some extremely dated examples of  “magnetism” (or hypnotism, as I took it to be), analyses of various forms of insanity (including examples of cures, also dated by 20^th century standards), to the importance of habit as the necessary development of the actual soul, which is the mediated unity of the soul with its body.

In the in depth treatment of insanity and the case studies which Hegel brings up in these sections covering insanity, I sometimes forgot that I was reading a philosophical treatise.

As I have mentioned in my previous journal entry, I can see Hegel as being an influence in modern-day phenomenological psychology. Much of his wording is similar to some articles I have read in a Psychology of Adolescence class that I took last year.

Hegel stresses that the “soul” (that is, a person’s self) needs to externalize itself, become separated from the body (that is, its native, inexperienced starting point), and find its content (or meaning-system) in the world. Then the soul needs to become proficient in the self’s body (and the world, which provides the criteria for forming proficiency) through training, which becomes habit.

Surprisingly, all of this “soul work” echoes throughout modern-day phenomenological psychology.

It’s been a while since I studied Aristotle, but I vaguely remember the importance of habit in shaping the soul. Upon looking at my old undergrad Philosophy and the Ethical Life notes, I see in my notes this phrase: “Moral virtue is a state of character, formed by habit; for example, a man is a brave man by habitually doing brave deeds.”

Thus both Aristotle and Hegel believe that habit is necessary for the development of the soul. For Aristotle, habit develops virtue. For Hegel, habit develops the actual soul. I believe “virtue” and “actual soul” are like pronunciations of the word “tomato,” i.e., Aristotle and Hegel are pretty much talking about the same concept.

Well then. Now that I know that Hegel tends to speak a little ahead of himself and then, after explaining a new concept (every-day usage of that word, not Hegel’s) links it with a review, I find Hegel a little more comprehending.

I am not saying that he has gotten easy to read, mind you. But that odd drowning sensation has ebbed a little, and I believe that I am now treading philosophical water with the man.